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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900022-CA
Priority No. 2

JOHNNY MEDINA DURAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Fairness requires a decision on the merits in this case.
This conditional appeal is not interlocutory.

The State's

argument that this Court has no jurisdiction over this case because
it is an interlocutory appeal is incorrect.

This case involves a

conditional appeal, which under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), is not considered interlocutory.
The plea was conditional.

As the record in the trial court

bears out, Mr. Duran pled guilty to the distribution charges because
he believed that, if he is successful in reversing the trial court's
denial of his motion to dismiss the habitual criminal charge, he
will return to stand trial on the distribution charges without
risking a life sentence under the improperly charged habitual
criminal statute.
After Mr. Duran's counsel articulated the prosecutor's
understanding of the conditional nature of the plea, the prosecutor
said nothing.

The State is too late now to contest the conditional

nature of Mr. Duran's plea.

Although the trial court expressed some doubt as to whether
this Court would hear an appeal relating to the dismissed habitual
criminal charge, the trial court heard Mr. Duran's understanding of
the plea and accepted Mr. Duran's plea.
This appeal is not moot and was not waived.

The mootness

doctrine, requiring a litigant to be affected by judicial
determinations, does not bar Mr. Duran's appeal because his plea was
conditional.

The conditional nature of the plea also vitiates the

State's waiver arguments.
The threat of the life sentence posed by the habitual
criminal conviction induced Mr. Duran to plead guilty to
distribution of controlled substances.

The dismissal of the

habitual criminal charge after Mr. Duran pled guilty does not
dissipate the coercive and injurious impact of the habitual criminal
charge.

If the conditional plea understood by Mr. Duran is honored,

as it should be, and he is eventually allowed to defend against the
distribution charges without the threat of the life sentence posed
by the habitual criminal charge, his rights will be affected by this
appeal.
In the event that this Court needs to reach the question,
this Court should reject the State's argument that conditional
appeals are permitted only in cases where the issues on appeal are
"dispositive."

Such a rule is inconsistent with Utah's

constitutional rights to appeal, and with the history of conditional
appeals in Utah.

The dispositive conditional appeal rule is not

applied strictly in jurisdictions that have adopted the rule, and
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the policy reasons behind the dispositive conditional appeal rule do
not call for its application under the facts of this case.

ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL.
The State repeatedly characterizes this appeal as
interlocutory, and argues that under Utah Code Ann. section 77-18a-l
(Supp. 1990) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(e),

this Court

may dismiss this appeal for want of appropriate procedure invoking
this Court's interlocutory appeal jurisdiction.

Appellee's brief

at 1 and n.l, 2, and 9.
While Mr. Duran unsuccessfully sought leave of the trial
court for interlocutory review of the trial court's failure to
dismiss the habitual criminal charge (T.2 11-13)# that motion for an
interlocutory appeal does not transform this appeal into an
interlocutory appeal.
If the State is arguing that conditional appeals are
interlocutory and must follow the procedural rules for interlocutory
appeals, the State is incorrect.

In State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935

(Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court explained as follows:
It is true that a conditional plea reserving
a suppression issue for appeal does not have the
complete finality of an unconditioned plea, but
it still results in a judgment of conviction, not
an interlocutory order. That judgment is as
final as any conviction after trial that might be
reversed on direct appeal.
Id. at 939.
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This Court's jurisdiction over this appeal is provided by
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), which grants appellate
jurisdiction over "appeals from district court in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital
felony."1

II.
THE PLEA WAS CONDITIONAL.
The State contends that the record in this case reflects an
unconditional plea, stating, "The remarks of the trial court and
counsel in connection with the plea bargain clearly show that the
State, and more especially the trial court neither agreed nor
accepted a conditional plea, if. in fact, the State actually offered
such."

Appellee's brief at 6 (emphasis added).

Such statements

must be evaluated with care.2

1. Appellate counsel for Mr. Duran, Elizabeth Holbrook,
erroneously indicated in the initial Statement of Jurisdiction that
this Court's jurisdiction is provided by "Utah Code Ann. section
76-2a-3(2)(e) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less than
first degree felonies)." Appellant's brief at 1. Subsection (e)
refers to interlocutory appeals, while subsection (f) refers to
jurisdiction over criminal convictions less than first degree
felonies, and should have been cited. Counsel for Mr. Duran has
made the same error in numerous other appeals from final orders,
e.g. State v. Kendall Northern. Case No. 900565-CA, and regrets any
contribution this may have had in the State's incorrect
jurisdictional argument in this case.
2. To the knowledge of Mr. Duran's appellate counsel, the
attorney general and the trial prosecutor currently both maintain
that the plea in this case was unconditional. Mr. Duran, his trial
counsel, Mary Corporon, and his appellate counsel maintain that the
plea in this case was conditional.
See State v. Mclntire. 93 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah Ct. App.
(footnote continues)
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In the trial court, Mr. Duran's trial counsel clearly
articulated the understanding of the prosecutor that the plea was
conditional, "Your Honor, I also wanted to indicate for the record,
one final aspect of the agreement I had with counsel, and I believe
she understood I would be specifically reserving on the record the
issue of our Motion to Dismiss Count 3 of the Information and the
legal issues raised regarding the habitual criminal statute, and it
will be my intention to reserve those for appellate review."
(T.2 65-66) (emphasis added).
The prosecutor did not dispute defense counsel's
characterization of the prosecutor's understanding of the
conditional nature of the plea.

Id.

The State should be bound by the record as it stands,
establishing that the prosecutor and Mr. Duran intended the plea to
be conditioned on his right to appeal the habitual criminal statute
issues.

See State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah

1988)(defense counsel characterized plea agreement between defense

(footnote 2 continued)
Oct. 17, 1988)(defense counsel stated at oral argument that plea was
unconditional); State v. Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 971 and n.2 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989)(defense counsel established on rehearing that plea
was conditional); State v. Bobo, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 25-26 and
n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(relying on assertion of assistant attorney
general, this Court found that plea was unconditional); State v.
Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(relying on
subsequent affidavit of trial court submitted by defense counsel on
rehearing, this Court found that plea was conditional); State v.
Geer, 765 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45
(Utah 1989)(this Court rejected Stated claim that appeal was waived
by entry of conditional guilty plea); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935,
937 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(prosecutor assented to conditional plea on
record in trial court; on appeal, State contended that conditional
plea was improper and mistaken).
- 5
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and State; counsel for the State did not object; "creating the
inference" that defense counsel's characterization of the bargain
was correct); State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294, 1306 (Utah 1986)(if State
disagrees with proposed plea agreement, State should object).
While the trial court disputed whether this Court would
hear an appeal on the issues involved in the habitual criminal count
because that count has been dismissed (see discussion in Point II,
establishing that the mootness concerns expressed by the trial court
are not applicable in the context of this conditional plea), the
court first heard Mr. Duran's understanding of the conditional
nature of the plea, and then accepted the plea.

The court stated,

They have been dismissed. . . . They will never
hear it. The State has dismissed it, but you can
make a record on that, if you want. . . . You
have a right to do what you want, but if it is
dismissed there is nothing to appeal there is no
issue. . . . If there is anything to appeal, and
I don't know if Mr. Duran would want vou to
appeal it. What if you lost? . . . You don't
need to say anything, Mr. Duran. That is on the
record. Whatever you do, you do. Since it is
dismissed, there is not that issue facing
Mr. Duran or the issue before the Court.
(T.2 66) (emphasis added).
While Mr. Duran's counsel acknowledged the trial court's
concerns about whether this Court would hear the appeal, nothing in
the record contradicts Mr. Duran's, trial counsel's, and the
prosecutor's understanding that the plea was conditional.

The trial

court allowed this record to be created, and accepted the plea.
If, as the State contends, the trial court did not accept
the conditional plea, the trial court would have called upon
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Mr. Duran to withdraw the plea.

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure

11(8)(b) and (c) (1990) provide,
(b) When a tentative plea agreement has been
reached that contemplates entry of a plea in the
expectation that other charges will be dropped or
dismissed the judge, upon request of the parties,
may permit the disclosure to him of the tentative
agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of
the time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel whether he will approve the
proposed disposition.
(c) If the judge then decides that final
disposition should not be in conformity with the
plea agreement, he shall advise the defendant and
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or
withdraw his plea.
The trial court's acceptance of Mr. Duran's maintained
intent to appeal the habitual criminal issues, and refraining from
calling on Mr. Duran to withdraw the plea demonstrate that the trial
court accepted the conditional plea.
If this Court were not in agreement that the record
establishes that the plea was conditional, this Court presumably
could remand this case for a hearing on the conditional nature of
the plea.

Particularly because the October 17, 1989, hearing in

this case preceded this Court's decision in State v. Bobo, 131 Utah
Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah Ct. App. March 19, 1990)(clarifying the
requirement to make an explicit record of the conditional plea),
this Court should act in the interest of judicial economy and decide
the merits of the habitual criminal issues raised by Mr. Duran.
People v. O'Neal. 421 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Mich. App. 1988)(court
decided merits in interest of judicial economy, rather than
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See

remanding to lower court on issue of conditional nature of the
plea); State v. Moore. 577 A.2d 348, 349 (Me. 1990)(same).

III.
THE APPEAL IS NOT MOOT AND WAS NOT WAIVED.
The State contends that Mr. Duran's appeal of the habitual
criminal charge is moot because the habitual charge was dismissed in
the plea bargain—he received "precisely the relief that [he] sought
when he first moved to have that charge dismissed."

Appellee's

brief at 7.
Mr. Duran did not receive precisely the same benefit in
having the habitual criminal charge dismissed after he pled guilty
to the distribution charges.

If the trial court had dismissed the

habitual criminal charge prior to trial, Mr. Duran could have
defended against the distribution charges without risking the life
sentence attendant to the habitual criminal conviction.

Mr. Duran

is currently serving a sentence in the Utah State Prison for the
distribution convictions, which convictions he intends a jury to
determine in the event that this Court agrees that the habitual
criminal count was improperly charged in this case.

Mr. Duran7s

undefended distribution convictions are a continuing injury to
Mr. Duran.
If this Court allows Mr. Duran7s conditional plea to be
honored and agrees that the habitual criminal charge is not proper
in this case, this Court will "affect the rights" of Mr. Duran by
allowing him to defend against the distribution charges.
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The

State's mootness argument, thus, does not apply to Mr. Duran's
conditional plea.

See Burkett v. Schwendiman. 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah

1989)(mootness doctrine is a discretionary doctrine used when
appellate decisions would not affect the rights of the litigants).
As shown by State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), Mr. Duran's reliance on conditional nature of the plea is
further reason to reject the discretionary mootness doctrine in this
case.

In Tebbs, the defendant entered a conditional no contest plea

to two counts of communications fraud, reserving the right to
challenge the constitutionality of the communications fraud
statute.

Id. at 776-777.

Prior to addressing the merits of the

issue, this Court voiced skepticism that the defendant had standing
to challenge the statute, because his argument was based on the
statute's placing the burden of proof on the defendant, and he did
not make any effort to meet that burden of proof in the trial
court.

Id. at 777. After explaining this Court's concerns about

the defendant's standing, this Court decided to reach the merits of
the issue, explaining in footnote 4:
Our decision to reach the merits is prompted
by the likelihood that defendant's perceived
ability to pursue the issue on appeal was
critical to his decision to enter a no-contest
plea, which also probably explains why the state
chose not to raise the standing issue.
While the standing doctrine of Tebbs differs from the
mootness doctrines in this case, both doctrines are discretionary.
While the State did not raise the standing issue in Tebbs, but
raises the mootness doctrine in this case, Mr. Duran, like
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Mr. Tebbs, relied on the understanding that he could have an appeal
on the merits in entering the conditional plea.

If the mootness

doctrine could properly apply in this case, this Court should follow
Tebbs and exercise its discretion to reach the merits of the case.
The State's closely related waiver argument, Appellee/s
brief at 8-12, is also inapposite because Mr. Duran's plea was
conditional.

The State argues that "A voluntary guilty plea is a

waiver of the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues."
Appellee's brief at 8.

While this axiom is correct, it does not

apply to cases involving conditional pleas.
935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

State v. Serv, 758 P.2d

Even if the waiver doctrine did

apply in the context of conditional pleas, because the State could
not have proceeded properly against Mr. Duran with the unsupportable
habitual criminal charge, the issue is like a jurisdictional issue
and cannot be waived.

£f. People v. Reid, 362 N.W.2d 655, 659

(Mich. 1984)(extending jurisdiction exemption of waiver doctrine to
include defects which do not relate to guilt or innocence, but
indicate that there should not have been a prosecution); id. at 663
(Ryan, J., dissenting)(discussing case law to the same effect).

IV.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT APPLY OR ADOPT
A "DISPOSITIVE ISSUE" CONDITIONAL APPEAL RULE.
The State contends that Mr. Duran's conditional appeal
should not be heard because a decision on the merits would not be
dispositive of the case.

Appellee's brief at 12-14.

A dispositive

issue rule would be inconsistent with the right to appeal protected
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by the Utah Constitution, and with traditional appellate practice in
this state.
The right to appeal is guaranteed not once, but twice, by
the Utah Constitution.

Article I section 12 provides, in part, "In

criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to appeal
in all cases." Article VIII section 5 provides, in part, "Except
for matters filed originally with the supreme court, there shall be
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the
cause."

These constitutional provisions speak in absolute terms,

and limiting appeals to "dispositive" issues would contravene these
constitutional provisions.
A "dispositive issue" rule would also be inconsistent with
appellate procedure in Utah.

While this Court has set forth

explicit standards on the entry of conditional pleas, e.g. State v.
Bobo, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), counsel for
Mr. Duran is unable to find one conditional plea case from this
Court or from the Utah Supreme Court applying a "dispositive issue"
rule.

While Sery does refer to other authorities applying a

"dispositive issue" rule, State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938-939 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), there is nothing in Sery indicating that the issue
decided on the merits by this Court was dispositive.

See Sery. 758

P.2d at 947 ("The order of the trial court denying defendant's
suppression motion is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.").

In Utah, even traditional appeals from final orders are
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frequently not dispositive.

See e.g. State v. Sampson, 143 Utah

Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(reversing conviction and remanding
for possible retrial); State v. Sampson. 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991)(recognizing district court's jurisdiction to release
Mr. Sampson pending further proceedings on appeal); State v.
Sampsonr 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(supplementing
initial opinion, maintaining the need for remand for possible
retrial).
The policy reasons for a "dispositive issue" rule do not
call for its adoption in this case.

In Everett v. State, 535 So.2d

667 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1988), the court explained the purposes
behind its "dispositive issue" rule:
First it enhances the likelihood that a meritless
appeal will not be pursued, and second, it
pretermits the potentially misleading formation
of a belief in the defendant that relief from the
judgment and sentence can be achieved in the
appellate court. Moreover, and as a corollary to
the foregoing, it would insure a timely
opportunity for the defendant to evaluate
withdrawal from the plea agreement.
Id. at 669.
While these policy reasons may be legitimate, in Utah,
criminal defendants are represented by attorneys at trial and on
appeal.

Attorneys are able and ethically obligated to serve the

policy reasons underlying the dispositive issue rule.

There is no

need for the rule.
The policy reasons behind the "dispositive issue" rule
would not be impacted adversely by this Court's decision on the
merits in this case.

Mr. Duran's appeal is not meritless.
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Mr. Duran wants the opportunity to defend against the distribution
charges, and is not under any impression that success on this appeal
will automatically obviate the distribution charges.

Mr. Duran does

not want to withdraw from the conditional plea agreement he made
with the prosecutor.
If this Court were to adopt a "dispositive issue rule," it
should not be applied in this case because Mr. Duran had no notice
of such a requirement.

See Wright v. State. 547 So.2d 258, 260

(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1989)(dispositive issue rule applied only in
cases following decision putting defendants on notice of the rule).
Even if a "dispositive issue" rule were published in this
jurisdiction prior to the hearing in this case, judicial economy
would call for a decision on the merits.

See Harrison v. State, 791

P.2d 359, 360 n.l (Alaska App. 1990)(court addressed the merits of
the issue despite the fact that the dispositive issue rule was not
met in order to conserve the parties' resources).

CONCLUSION
This Court should reach the merits of this case.

Respectfully submitted this 'fs j^^day
1991.
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